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Abstract 
The destruction wrought by even just wars lends undeniable appeal 
to radical pacifism, according to which all wars are unjust. Yet radical 
pacifism is fundamentally flawed. In the past decade, a moderate and 
more defensible form of pacifism has emerged. According to what has 
been called ‘contingent pacifism’, it is very unlikely that it is morally 
permissible to wage any given war. This chapter develops the doctrine 
of contingent pacifism by distinguishing and developing various versions 
of it, and by assessing the merits and drawbacks of each. According to 
‘proportionality-based’ contingent pacifism, almost all wars with just 
causes are unjust ‘tout court’ because the in bello harms such wars 
impose on the innocent are too great relative to the relevant evils 
averted by achieving the war’s aims. After arguing against this view, 
the chapter introduces a novel, more defensible form of contingent 
pacifism, called ‘epistemic-based’ contingent pacifism, according to 
which the prevalence of mistaken judgements regarding the justness of 
wars, combined with the devastating harmfulness of unjust wars, 
requires imposing prohibitions against waging war, where the strength 
of the prohibition varies according to whether the government has a 
history of mistakes or deception regarding the justness of wars.  
 
1. Introduction  
According to the most radical prohibition against war, there are no 
circumstances in which it is morally permissible to wage a war. On this view, 
which can be called “absolute pacifism”, waging war is always morally wrong, 
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not because of what war tends to involve – e.g., destruction on a mass scale, 
the killing of non-combatants, etc. – but rather because war itself is 
intrinsically wrong. According to a slightly less radical prohibition against 
war, it is permissible to wage a war provided that no non-combatants are 
killed. The resulting prohibition, which I will call “conditional pacifism”, 
relegates permissible wars to the realm of conceptual possibility, since all 
modern wars (aside from nominal ones) ineluctably result in the killing of at 
least some non-combatants. Robert L. Holmes seems committed to this view, 
insofar as he both rejects consequentialist arguments in favor of killing 
innocents, and claims that if the actions necessary for waging war cannot be 
justified, then neither can the war itself be justified (1989, p. 181). Elizabeth 
Anscombe is also committed to conditional pacifism, having famously written 
that anyone who believes that it is ever permissible to kill an innocent 
displays “a corrupt mind” (1958, p. 17). Both absolute and conditional 
pacifism are, however, morally untenable. These types of pacifism, though 
noble, are “dangerously otherworldly in the face of utterly unrestrained 
oppression or aggression,” in the words of Igor Primoratz (2002, p. 221). 
Recently, a more moderate type of pacifism has emerged – one which is more 
defensible than absolute or conditional pacifism. This alternative type of war-
based pacifism, recently espoused by Larry May (2008, pp. 31-35) and 
criticized by Jeff McMahan (2010), is called “contingent pacifism”.  
Contingent pacifists, unlike conditional pacifists, acknowledge that though 
innocent non-combatants have a right not to be killed by others, this right is 
not absolute; for instance, this right can be trumped by considerations of 
proportionality. Nonetheless, contingent pacifists believe that for any given 
war with just aims, it is very unlikely that it is morally permissible to wage 
that war. This is not to say that the possibility of a morally permissible war 
is merely conceptual. Rather, according to contingent pacifists, there have 
been and in all likelihood will be morally permissible wars. As a result, it 
might seem that contingent pacifism is not a version of pacifism at all. But 
contingent pacifism still count as a version of contingent pacifism, insofar as 
it treats war, at the level of national and international policy as an activity 
that cannot be licitly undertaken. On this picture, we ought to treat the 
prospect of waging a war in roughly the same way we treat the prospect of 
committing an act of terrorism: as morally reprehensible as terrorism is, 
there might be, on very rare occasions, circumstances in which it is 
permissible or even obligatory to commit an act of terrorism. But this does 
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not mean that we should have a Department of Terrorism, or government-
funded and trained terrorists standing by to commit acts of terrorism; the 
same goes for war, if contingent pacifism is correct.  
Contingent pacifism, as an account of the morality of war, is still in a 
nascent stage of development. The purpose of this paper is to advance this 
topic by distinguishing and developing various versions of it, and by assessing 
the merits and drawbacks of each. In so doing, I will distinguish the type of 
contingent pacifism that May and McMahan consider from a significantly 
different and novel type of contingent pacifism which I introduce. According 
to the type of contingent pacifism that May espouses and McMahan 
criticizes, almost all wars with just causes are unjust ‘tout court’ because 
they violate the constraint of proportionality: the harms they impose on the 
innocent are too great relative to the relevant evils averted by achieving the 
war’s aims. Accordingly, I call this type of contingent pacifism 
“proportionality-based” contingent pacifism. There are several ways one 
might attempt to ground this type of pacifism. I will discuss three of these 
methods. In doing so, I will argue that if proportionality-based contingent 
pacifism is indeed mistaken, it is unlikely to be for the reasons that 
McMahan provides.  
I will end by distinguishing proportionality-based contingent pacifism from 
what I call “epistemic-based” contingent pacifism, according to which the 
prevalence of false-positive judgments regarding the justness of wars, 
combined with the devastating harmfulness of unjust wars, requires that we 
err on the side of caution by adopting strong presumptions against the 
permissibility of waging wars – even if the presumption disallows, on 
occasion, waging just wars. I will argue that the strength of this presumption 
is relative to particular governments, depending specifically on whether the 
government in question has a history of mistakenly identifying unjust wars as 
just. This version of contingent pacifism is, I believe, more plausible than 
proportionality-based contingent pacifism. 
 
2. Proportionality Based Contingent Pacifism 
A war with a just cause fails to satisfy the constraint of proportionality, and 
is thus unjust ‘tout court’, if the war inflicts too much harm on innocents 
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relative to the relevant goods consisting in the achievement of the war’s just 
causes. In calculating whether a war satisfies the constraint of 
proportionality, the weight that a harm receives depends on how morally bad 
the harm is. Thus, for example, if killing an innocent is morally worse than 
allowing an innocent to die, then the harm of killing an innocent would count 
for more in the proportionality-calculation than the harm of allowing an 
innocent to die; that is, to satisfy the constraint of proportionality, a greater 
evil would have to be averted by killing an innocent, than would have to be 
averted by allowing an innocent to die. According to proportionality-based 
contingent pacifism, the constraint of proportionality is very unlikely to be 
met in any given war; as a result, it is very unlikely that any given war is 
just.  
In what follows I will investigate in detail three ways that a proportionality-
based contingent pacifist might argue that wars are very unlikely to satisfy 
the constraint of proportionality. The first method involves arguing in favor 
of a stronger restriction on killing innocents in warfare. According to this 
argument, the evil which must be averted in order to permissibly kill 
innocents is significantly greater than generally presumed, which makes 
satisfying the proportionality-constraint significantly harder. A second 
method involves arguing that combatants – including those who participate 
in the furtherance of unjust aims – fail to satisfy a necessary basis for 
liability to defensive violence; as a result, killing such combatants constitutes 
a much greater moral harm than typically presumed. This makes satisfying 
the proportionality-constraint significantly harder. The third method of 
defending proportionality-based contingent pacifism involves arguing that, in 
war, some of the harms that the enemy commits ought to count in the 
proportionality-calculation as harms that we cause, which makes satisfying 
the proportionality constraint, again, significantly harder.  
Put very roughly, each of these arguments supports varying strengths of 
proportionality-based contingent pacifism by ‘raising the bar’ on how much 
evil must be averted in order for a war to be morally permissible. However, 
no matter how high the bar is raised, there remains the (real) possibility of a 
war necessary to avert an evil so severe, that the war does indeed satisfy 
constraints of proportionality. For this reason, arguments in favor of 
proportionality-based contingent pacifism support varying strengths of 
contingent pacifism at best, rather than conditional or absolute pacifism.  
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2.1. The Strength of the Agent-Centered Restriction on Killing 
Non-Combatants 
Virtually all modern wars involve killing non-combatants. We nonetheless 
generally think there is some prohibition against killing non-combatants, 
because typical non-combatants generally do not pose direct threats, and 
because they do not bear significant responsibility for threats posed by 
combatants. For these reasons, typical non-combatants are not liable to be 
attacked in warfare – such non-combatants are, in the relevant sense, 
“innocents”. (I am putting aside for now the much-discussed issue of whether 
combatants fighting in furtherance of just aims count as ‘innocent’. For the 
sake of simplicity, in this section my use of the term “innocent” should be 
taken to refer to innocent non-combatants only). What sort of prohibition 
against killing innocents is appropriate?  
We generally think that there is an agent-centered restriction on killing 
innocents – a restriction that prohibits killing innocents even to prevent 
further violations of the same restriction. An absolute restriction of this sort 
is clearly too strong (though, obviously, conditional pacifists will believe 
otherwise). According to an alternative ‘weighted’ agent-centered restriction 
on killing innocents, it is permissible to kill a given number of innocents if 
doing so is necessary to save x times as many innocents. A strong enough 
weighted agent-centered restriction on killing would prevent the 
proportionality constraint from being satisfied in the vast majority of 
warfare. On this view, wars with just causes will almost certainly violate the 
constraint of proportionality by resulting in more innocent deaths than can 
be justified by the goods the achievement of the just cause consists in – even 
if these goods consist in preventing further deaths. For example, consider a 
war with the aim of averting an obvious and tremendous wrong, e.g., the 
widespread massacre of a domestic ethnic minority population by a foreign 
government. Suppose that achieving this just aim will unavoidably result in 
some collateral non-combatant casualties. The weighted agent-centered 
restriction against killing is so strong, the proportionality-based contingent 
pacifist will argue, that the collateral non-combatant deaths will almost 
certainly violate the constraint of proportionality, even if these deaths are a 
necessary side-effect of preventing the massacres. This is not say, however, 
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that all possible wars are unjust – a weighted agent-centered restriction 
leaves open the possibility of a war which averts a moral harm so 
catastrophic, that killing some innocents is justified if necessary to avert that 
harm. For this reason, proportionality-based contingent pacifism counts as a 
version of contingent pacifism and not conditional pacifism.  
As David Rodin points out, most just wars are not fought to prevent deaths. 
Rather, they are fought to protect the civil and political rights of citizenry 
who are threatened by a foreign or domestic power (Rodin, 2002, pp. 130-
132). But if the weighted agent-centered restriction on killing is so strong 
that it prohibits killing even a few innocents to prevent the unjust murder of 
many others, then presumably the restriction is strong enough to prohibit 
killing even a few innocents to prevent the civil rights violations of many 
others. But is the weighted agent-centered restriction on killing so strong 
that it prohibits killing a few innocents to prevent the murder of many 
others? 
Jeff McMahan argues that the weighted agent-centered restriction against 
killing is not as strong as the proportionality-based contingent pacifist thinks 
it is (2010). That is, the restriction does not prohibit killing a few innocents 
as a necessary means or side-effect of preventing the unjust killings of many 
others. McMahan’s method is to show that, under conditions of uncertainty, 
the application of a very strong restriction on killing yields absurd results.  
Suppose the proportionality-based contingent pacifist claims that it 
impermissible to kill one innocent person even if doing so is necessary to save 
one hundred other innocents from being unjustly killed. If this is true, 
McMahan argues, it follows that it is impermissible to impose a one percent 
risk of death on an innocent even if doing so is necessary to save another 
innocent’s life. This restriction on killing under conditions of uncertainty, 
McMahan argues, would prohibit accepted standards of risk-imposition 
associated with common practices that impose small but significant risks of 
death on innocents. For instance, we impose small risks on pedestrians and 
on children in other cars when we drive. McMahan argues that because the 
proportionality-based contingent pacifist’s restriction on killing is so strong 
that it prohibits driving and other intuitively acceptable risk-imposing 
activities, the restriction is too strong. 
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But I think McMahan’s argument is inadequate. Consider the following 
inference. 
If 
a. killing one innocent to save the lives of one hundred innocents is 
impermissible,  
then 
b. it is impermissible to impose on an innocent a one-percent chance of 
death even if doing so will save the life of some other innocent.  
McMahan takes it for granted that (a) entails (b). But there are reasons to 
doubt this. It is plausible that as a permissibly imposed risk increases in 
probability, the harm that the permissibly imposed risk must avert increases 
disproportionately. For example, for it to be permissible to impose a 50 
percent chance of death on an innocent, one must thereby avert more than 
ten times the harm one would avert in permissibly imposing a five percent 
chance of death on an innocent. On this view, we ought to be risk-averse in 
circumstances such as those involving imposing risks on innocents, in that we 
ought to be disproportionally cautious as the probability of killing an 
innocent approaches certainty. If greater risks must avert disproportionately 
greater harms, then the proportionality-based contingent pacifist can 
consistently claim (a) while denying (b). That is, proportionality-based 
contingent pacifism can plausibly claim that permissibly imposing a 100 
percent chance of death on an innocent must avert more than one hundred 
times the harm that permissibly imposing a one percent chance of death 
must avert. Likewise, imposing a one percent chance of death on an innocent 
need not avert one-hundredth the harm that imposing a 100 percent chance 
of death must avert. Put more generally, the proportionality-based 
contingent pacifist can consistently claim that i) killing one innocent is 
impermissible unless it is necessary to save the lives of at least y other 
innocents, and ii) it is permissible to impose on an innocent a risk of death 
greater than 1/y even if doing so does not save any lives.  
The upshot is that McMahan cannot presume that the relationship between 
the degree of risk permissibly imposed and the amount of harm that it must 
avert, is linear. A proportionality-based contingent pacifist can indeed claim 
that a weighted restriction on killing is strong enough to disallow all warfare, 
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without claiming that the restriction disallows accepted standards of 
miniscule risk-imposition.  
Where does this leave us? The proportionality-based contingent pacifist 
claims that a weighted agent-centered restriction on killing is strong enough 
to prohibit almost all war with just aims, since such wars cause the deaths of 
too many innocents. The threshold at which it becomes permissible to kill an 
innocent as a necessary means or side-effect of saving others is so high, on 
this view, that it is very unlikely that any war will meet it. Like McMahan, I 
am skeptical of this claim. Intuitively, this restriction on killing seems too 
strong. At the same time, however, McMahan’s argument that this 
restriction is inconsistent with accepted standards of risk-imposition is too 
quick. Still, proportionality-based contingent pacifists need an argument to 
show that the weighted agent-centered restriction on killing is as strong as 
they think it is. That is, contingent pacifists need to provide positive reasons 
for thinking that we cannot kill one innocent as a side-effect of saving many 
more. Absent such an argument, we are left, at best, at an impasse. In any 
case, I turn now to another argument in favor of proportionality-based 
contingent pacifism.  
 
2.2. The Innocence of Unjust Combatants and their Liability to 
Defensive Violence 
Typical wars involve killing combatants. In the proportionality-calculation of 
a war, if the deaths of combatants counted as heavily as the deaths of non-
combatants, then virtually no war would satisfy the constraint of 
proportionality. In contemporary just war theory, the deaths of combatants 
count for much less in calculations of proportionality than do the deaths of 
non-combatants. The agent-centered restriction on killing combatants when 
it is necessary to achieve an aim, is thought to be far more lax than the 
restrictions against killing non-combatants when it is necessary to achieve an 
aim. But if unjust combatants are not to blame for their participation in the 
war, and if blame is a necessary basis for liability to defensive violence, then 
unjust combatants, like most non-combatants, are not liable to be killed. If 
this is correct, then killing unjust combatants who are not liable to be killed 
is as bad or nearly as bad as killing non-combatants who are not liable to be 
killed. As a result, the deaths of unjust combatants would count as heavily or 
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nearly as heavily in the proportionality-calculation as the deaths of non-
combatants. If combatants are typically not to blame for their participation, 
and blame is a necessary basis for liability to intentional attack, then the evil 
averted by intentionally killing non-culpable combatants must be very great 
– nearly as great as the evil that must be averted in order for an attack upon 
non-combatants to be justified. This makes satisfying the constraint of 
proportionality virtually impossible in wars that involve killing enemy 
combatants, even if those combatants are furthering unjust aims.  
There is an on-going debate regarding what the basis of liability to defensive 
violence is in general, and in the context of warfare specifically. Some believe 
that combatants fighting in furtherance of a just aim (i.e., just combatants) 
are morally liable to be attacked by unjust combatants, provided that the 
attack is necessary for furthering some sufficiently significant military aim.1 
There are those, however, who argue in favor of less permissive conditions for 
liability to attack; on one such a view, for a combatant to be liable to attack, 
it is not enough that the attack is necessary to further some military aim – 
rather, such an attack must further a just aim.2 On this view, unlike the 
more permissive account, combatants engaged in defensive violence against 
unjust aggressors intent on conquering their country, are not liable to attack 
by those aggressors, provided that the defensive violence is necessary to stop 
the aggression. However, even on this more restrictive account, unjust 
combatants are still liable to be attacked, provided that doing so will reduce 
or eliminate some unjust threat severe enough to justify the degree of 
preventive harm intentionally imposed on the unjust combatant.  
An even less permissive account of the conditions for the basis of liability to 
attack during warfare is needed to broaden the scope of the proportionality-
calculation so that it both includes the deaths of just and unjust combatants 
and weighs them as heavily or nearly as heavily as the deaths of non-
combatants. According to one such account of the conditions for the basis of 
liability to attack during warfare, the target of intentional attack must not 
                                                          
1 Various arguments in favor of this view can be found in (Kutz, 2005), (Hurka, 
Liability and Just Cause, 2007), (Shue, 2008). 
2 This view is defended in (Rodin, 2002, pp. 163-173), (McMahan, 2006), and 
(McMahan, 2009, pp. 104-202). 
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only pose an unjust threat, but must do so culpably.3 That is, a combatant is 
liable to be attacked only if that combatant poses an unjust threat and is to 
blame for posing that threat. If this is correct, then combatants who are 
innocent threats – i.e., who pose threats non-culpably – are not liable to 
attack. That they are not liable to attack does not mean that attacking them 
is always impermissible; but it does means that the weighted agent-centered 
restriction against attacking them is much stronger than the weighted agent-
centered restriction against attacking those who are indeed liable to be 
attacked. There are several ways that an unjust threat might be innocent; I 
will briefly discuss those relevant to warfare.4  
Imposing certain types of threats can mitigate culpability for unjust actions 
taken as a result of the coercive threat. It is, however, controversial whether 
any threat – including a threat of death – can fully eliminate culpability for 
compliance with a coerced demand to unjustly kill another. Militaries 
coercively threaten their combatants with a variety of physical and 
psychological punishments in order to discourage non-compliance with orders. 
If the only way for a combatant to avoid unjustly killing an enemy 
combatant is to desert, and if the threat of punishment for desertion is severe 
enough, then the degree of blame that the combatant bears for unjustly 
killing is mitigated, and perhaps, in some cases, eliminated. Whether and to 
what extent blame is mitigated depends, of course, on the type and severity 
of the punishment with which the combatants are threatened. It is revealing, 
in this case, to consider the standards of excuse applied in the domestic 
criminal law. In most jurisdictions, the threat of death – let alone lesser 
threats – does not provide a fully mitigating legal excuse for killing an 
innocent. Why should we believe that an analogous threat fully excuses 
combatants from unjustly killing those who are not liable to be killed? The 
burden of proof lies on the side of those who claim that there is something 
about war which relaxes the standards of excuse for unjustified killing. While 
it is safe to say that threats of punishment partially mitigate culpability, it is 
                                                          
3 For more on the role of culpability in warfare, see (Zohar, 1993) and (Ferzan, 2005).  
4 Others have discussed this issue in more detail; see for example (Rodin, 2002, pp. 
90-98) and (Lichtenberg, 2008). 
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doubtful that such threats eliminate a combatant’s culpability for unjustly 
killing others. 
There are, however, other reasons for believing that a combatant’s 
culpability for killing unjustly is significantly mitigated if not eliminated. 
Some individuals who kill unjustly are not fully culpable because they are 
non-culpably ignorant of the relevant moral or non-moral facts. Combatants 
who voluntarily join the military have or are disposed to have a deferential 
attitude toward the moral authority of their superiors. This, combined with 
what Walzer describes as “[t]heir routine habits of law-abidingness, their fear, 
their patriotism, their moral investment in the state”, not to mention the 
pliability of youth, render them highly susceptible to deception and 
indoctrination by the state (2000, p. 39). The resulting ignorance regarding 
the moral and non-moral facts in virtue of which a war is unjust might 
significantly mitigate their culpability for killing the combatants on the just 
side in a war.  
Mitigated culpability also arises from threats faced during combat. A 
combatant might not realize the unjustness of participating in a particular 
combat operation, or even a war, until she is entrenched in combat. Perhaps, 
given the evidence available prior to combat, she was justified in believing 
that enemy combatants were liable to attack; only during combat does it 
become evident that this is not so.  
If the combatant realizes during combat that participating is unjust, then she 
is morally obligated to cease participation. But acting on such a decision 
during combat operations significantly increases (we can suppose) her 
likelihood of injury or death (not the mention the injury or death of the 
combatants who depend upon her participation). In the same way that 
threats of physical punishment can mitigate responsibility for continued 
participation in an unjust aim, the threat of injury or death resulting from 
ceasing participation during combat can mitigate responsibility for a failure 
to do so.  
To justify proportionality-based contingent pacifism, it is not enough to show 
that some combatants are not liable to be killed some of the time; thus it is 
not enough to show that some unjust combatants are not to blame for the 
unjust threats they pose some of the time, even assuming culpability is a 
necessary basis for liability to intentional attack. But it is safe to say, I 
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think, that even if the mitigating factors I’ve mentioned do not individually 
eliminate or significantly mitigate culpability for most combatants most of 
the time, it is likely that they do so combination. If this is correct, then to 
kill such combatants is to kill threats that are largely or significantly non-
culpable. If culpability is a necessary basis for liability to defensive violence, 
and if combatants are typically non-culpable, then combatants are not liable 
to be attacked, even if they pose an unjust threat. If this is correct, and if all 
but nominal wars involve killing combatants, then all wars – including those 
with just aims – will very likely violate constraints of proportionality. This is 
the upshot of the argument from the innocence of unjust combatants. Of 
course, there might be wars in which the evil prevented by intentionally 
killing non-liable combatants is so great, and the number of non-liable 
combatants killed is so small, that those killings are justified as a necessary 
means to preventing the great evil. For this reason, the argument from the 
innocence of unjust combatants entails contingent pacifism and not 
conditional pacifism.  
Though I am sympathetic to the view that combatants are often non-
culpable, I believe it is a mistake to think that culpability is a basis of 
liability to defensive violence.5 Any combatant (aside from child soldiers) is 
in a position to recognize that participating in any war is a morally risky 
activity, in the sense that war always involves imposing prima facie wrongs – 
e.g., killing, destruction, etc. They know enough to know that even if the 
evidence suggests the war is just, there remains a significant chance that the 
war is unjust, in which case the acts committed in furtherance of the war’s 
aims are egregiously wrong. By participating in a war – even one that seems 
just – a combatant is participating in a morally risky activity. If the risk 
actualizes, then she is morally liable to be attacked, in virtue of having 
courted this risk. The upshot is that combatants can be liable to be killed 
even if they are non-culpably mistaken in their belief that the war is just.  
Of course, this leaves largely unanswered the question of what the basis of 
liability to defensive killing is – the basis might be that of posing a threat, 
posing an unjust threat, or responsibility for posing an unjust threat, to 
                                                          
5 See also (McMahan, 2005). 
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name a few contested possibilities.6 But I am concerned here with a 
particular defense of proportionality-based contingent pacifism. According to 
this defense, wars are unjust because they kill too many morally innocent 
persons, and a reason for thinking that the number killed will always be too 
many, is that enemy combatants count as morally innocent. This particular 
defense of proportionality-based contingent pacifism requires a defense of the 
view that culpability is a necessary basis of liability to defensive violence. 
And as I have argued, we can plausibly maintain that culpability is not a 
necessary basis of liability in war.  
 
2.3. Negative Responsibility for Harms Committed by an Unjust 
Enemy 
To determine whether a war satisfies the constraint of proportionality, we 
must assess the various harms we cause in the pursuit of that war’s aims. In 
making this assessment, ought we to include the harms that the enemy 
commits – specifically, the harms that the enemy would not have committed 
had we chosen not to wage the war? If some of the harms that the enemy 
commits ought to be included in the proportionality-calculation, then the evil 
that the war must avert, in order to be just, must be severe enough to 
outweigh not only the harms that we impose upon innocents, but some of the 
harms that the enemy imposes upon innocents as well. This makes satisfying 
the constraint of proportionality all the more difficult. If the harms that the 
enemy commits ought to be included in the proportionality-calculation, then 
should those harms count for less, given that they were committed not by us 
but by the enemy? Undoubtedly, the answer to these questions will depend 
in part on the type of harm involved, the purpose (if any) behind committing 
the harm, who the victims of the harm are, etc. (For instance, if the enemy 
kills non-combatants that we are using as involuntary human-shields, then 
presumably the harm ought to fully count in the proportionality-calculation, 
even though it is the enemy, strictly speaking, who kills the human shields).  
                                                          
6 See (Thomson, 1991), (Otsuka, 1994), (Rodin, 2002, pp. 79-83), (Øverland, 2005), 
and (Frowe, 2008).  
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If the harms the enemy commits ought to be included in the proportionality-
calculation, then this is presumably because we bear a version of what 
Bernard Williams called “negative responsibility” for those harms; for our 
purposes here, this is defined as responsibility for what others foreseeably and 
voluntarily do in response to one’s own actions (1973, p. 95). I cannot 
provide here the conditions determining when and the degree to which we 
bear negative responsibility. Rather, my purpose here is to show how 
particular stances on this issue can undergird proportionality-based 
contingent pacifism. In what follows, I lay out an example which shows how 
the possibility of satisfying the proportionality-constraint is influenced by 
various stances we might take on the issue of how we ought to count, in 
proportionality-calculations, the harms that the enemy commits. 
Suppose country U launches an unjust attack, intentionally targeting non-
combatants in country D which cannot effectively defend itself. However, our 
country is in a position to stop the attacks by country U. The only way to do 
so is for us to invade and overthrow the government. Because U has minimal 
defenses, the invasion of U will result in few non-combatant causalities. 
Suppose that, ultimately, many members of the military in U respond to the 
overthrow of their government by engaging in acts of terrorism, in which 
they targets their own citizens, in order to deter domestic cooperation with 
the foreign invaders. So though our government prevents the government of 
U from launching further attacks against non-combatants in D, our invasion, 
though necessary to stop these attacks, prompts the remnants of U’s military 
into killing a significant number of non-combatants in their own country. 
Suppose the number of non-combatants in U killed by U’s military is greater 
than the number of non-combatants in D that the government of U would 
have killed had we not invade U. And suppose further that U had a despotic 
government prior to its invasion – the vast majority of non-combatants in U 
did not consent to, and are not responsible for, their government’s attack on 
D.  
By invading U as a necessary means of stopping U’s unjustified attacks 
against D’s non-combatants do we violate constraints of proportionality? In 
assessing the various harms that we cause in the pursuit of our war’s aims, if 
we do not count the acts of terrorism that U’s military commits against its 
own population, then our invasion of U might indeed satisfy constraints of 
proportionality. But if we do indeed count the deaths that U commits in 
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response to our invasion, then our invasion almost certainly violates the 
constraint of proportionality. Whether we include in the proportionality-
calculation the harms we indirectly cause the enemy to commit, has a 
tremendous effect on whether the proportionality constraints are satisfied.  
Thomas Hurka raises the same sort of issue; he notes that whether the 
wrongful choices of others can reduce our responsibility for bad outcomes in 
war is vital in the analysis of the proportionality-constraint. He points out 
that “the more the proportionality conditions discount resulting evils for 
others’ wrongful agency, the more permissive those conditions are; the less 
the conditions discount, the more wars and acts they forbid” (2005, p. 50). 
He rejects the ‘permissive view’ according to which we ought not to include, 
in the proportionality-calculation, the harms that the enemy commits. 
Though the permissive view strikes many as untenable, it has its adherents. 
For example, Holmes argues in favor of the permissive view (ironically in 
furtherance of a pacifistic argument) when he claims that we are not 
responsible for what others do, even if their actions are a consequence of 
decisions we have made (1989, p. 205).  
Hurka also rejects ‘the restrictive view’ according to which, in the 
proportionality-calculation, we ought to include all the harms that the enemy 
would not have committed were it not for us – on this view, these harms 
should count just as heavily as the harms that we commit. Advocating the 
restrictive view is a way to underwrite proportionality-based contingent 
pacifism. If the restrictive view is correct, then even paradigm examples of 
just wars might violate the constraint of proportionality. For example, David 
Rodin, at one point, suggests that the defeat of Nazi Germany ultimately 
might have caused more harm than it averted (Rodin, 2002, pp. 10-11). This 
alone certainly does not, he points out, mean that the war is unjust. But if 
Rodin is correct and if the harms Nazi Germany committed in the course of 
fighting the Allies – harms that the Allies could have avoided by refusing to 
fight Nazi Germany – ought to be included in the proportionality-calculation 
partly determining whether the war fought by the Allies is just, then the war 
seems to violate the constraint of proportionality.  
I will briefly argue against the restrictive view by presenting a competing, 
intermediate view, which addresses the issue of negative responsibility as it 
applies in the context of warfare specifically. This view, even in its 
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preliminary form, has decisive advantages. According to this intermediate 
view, we ought to include in the proportionality calculation both the harms 
that we commit as well as those that the enemy commits in response to what 
we do. But on this view, unlike the restrictive view, there is a weighted 
agent-centered restriction only on the deaths that that we directly cause; 
there is no weighted agent-centered restriction on the deaths that the enemy 
causes (provided that the enemy kills against our wishes). Put differently, 
there are deontic constraints on killing directly, but ‘only’ utilitarian 
constraints on indirectly causing others to kill unjustly, when they do so 
contrary to our wishes. To better understand this view, return to the 
previous example in which we invade U in order to stop U from attacking 
non-combatants in D. Recall that, in response to our invasion, U begins 
targeting its own citizens. Suppose we need to decide whether invading U, 
thereby indirectly causing U to kill its own citizens, violates the constraint of 
proportionality. On the intermediate view, the non-combatants that U kills 
in response to our attack still ought to count in the proportionality 
calculation that partly determines whether our invasion is just. So if U kills 
too many non-combatants relative to the number that we save, our invasion 
violates constraints of proportionality. However, according to the 
intermediate view, unlike the restrictive view, innocents that U kills in 
response to our invasion count for less in the proportionality calculation than 
those that we kill directly, in that there is no weighted agent-centered 
restriction against indirectly and unintentionally causing U to kill. On this 
view, it is much easier to satisfy the constraint of proportionality when the 
enemy is doing the killing than when we are.  
The claim that the innocents killed by U count for less might seem callous. 
But note that in the proportionality-calculation those deaths are given at 
least as much weight as they would be given from a strictly utilitarian 
standpoint. By presuming a weighted agent-centered restriction on the killing 
that we commit, we do not decrease the weight of the deaths that U commits 
– rather, we increase the weight of the deaths that we commit. Put simply, it 
is morally worse to be the ones who are doing the killing. The non-
combatants that we kill count for more in our proportionality-calculation 
than the non-combatants that U kills in response our invasion, not because 
the non-combatants that they kill are worth less, but rather because there is 
a weighted agent-centered restriction against killing, but no such restriction 
on foreseeably, indirectly, and unintentionally causing others to kill. (Note 
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that this formulation forecloses on a “moral loophole” in which we 
intentionally outsource killing to others in order to avoid the agent-centered 
restriction on killing. Since outsourcing the killing is done intentionally, we 
bear the same responsibility or nearly the same as we would if we had done 
the killing ourselves, on the grounds that though the killings were not 
committed by us, they were nonetheless willed be us).  
The plausibility of the intermediate view does not itself defeat the argument 
from negative responsibility – rather, it serves as a plausible, alternative 
account of how we ought to factor, in the calculation of proportionality, the 
harms that the enemy commits because of us. And on this alternative 
account, bearing some negative responsibility for these harms does not lead 
to proportionality-based contingent pacifism.  
 
3. Epistemic-Based Contingent Pacifism  
I will end by considering a novel form contingent pacifism. According to 
what I call “epistemic-based” contingent pacifism, it is very unlikely that it is 
permissible to wage a candidate war, not because it is very unlikely that the 
war will satisfy all the conditions of a just war, but rather because we cannot 
reliably determine whether a candidate war is just. More specifically, we too 
often make false positive judgments regarding whether a war is just. The 
prevalence of these false positives casts significant doubt on the general 
reliability of a claim that a war is just. Because going to war when it is 
impermissible to do so tends to be very wrong, we ought to err on the side of 
caution by adopting a strong presumption against waging wars.  
The strength of this presumption, however, depends on the reliability of a 
government’s judgments regarding the justness of a war. For example, if a 
government has not in recent history made any false-positive judgments 
regarding whether a war is just, then the prohibition against waging a given 
war will be much weaker for that government that it would be for one which 
has a history of culpable false-positive judgments (especially if the 
government refuses to take measures significantly reducing the probability 
that such mistakes will be made again). In such a case, there may very well 
be just wars that we ought not to fight, because we are subjectively 
unjustified in believing such wars to be just. The claim here is not that all 
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the candidate wars that such a government proposes to wage are unjust, but 
rather that culpably mistaken or deceptive judgments in the past precludes 
justifiably believing of a candidate wars that it is just.  
There remains the possibility, however, of a candidate war the justness of 
which is luminously obvious, despite the untrustworthiness of the 
government’s claims that the war is just. Suppose a neighboring country 
embarks on a campaign of extra-territorial genocide against our country; this, 
if anything, seems to justify a war of self-defense. In this case, past 
governmental mistakes do not undermine belief in the moral fact that 
defending against genocide is a just cause for war. In response, it might be 
argued that even if past governmental mistakes cannot undermine justified 
belief in the claim that preventing genocide is a just cause for war, past 
government mistakes – or more likely, outright deception – can indeed 
undermine justified belief in purported non-moral facts, such as the claim 
that a genocide is occurring, that it can only be stopped through war, etc. If 
we know that the government has, for example, falsely accused others of 
genocide in the past, this casts significant doubt on the government’s present 
claim that a genocide is occurring. But if there are government-independent 
means to confirm or deny the relevant non-moral facts, and if these means 
are reliable enough, then supporting the war might be justified, according to 
the epistemic-based contingent pacifist. In this extreme case, the justness of a 
candidate war is obvious to an extent that silences skepticism raised by the 
fact that the government has culpably made false-positive judgments in the 
past.  
The upshot is that it is possible for there to be just wars which we are in a 
position to recognize as just, despite past deception and mistakes from the 
government. So according to epistemic-based contingent pacifism, though 
there is a strong presumption against the permissibility of supporting wars 
waged by relevantly unreliable governments, such a presumption is, in rare 
cases, defeasible. This is why epistemic-based contingent pacifism is a version 
of contingent pacifism, and not conditional pacifism.  
It might be argued that abiding by the (defeasible) prohibition imposed by 
epistemic-based contingent pacifism would allow significant evils to occur, by 
prohibiting us from waging just wars. But epistemic-based contingent 
pacifism prohibits waging just wars only when we have strong reasons to 
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believe that the war is in fact unjust. That is, it will never be the case that 
epistemic-based contingent pacifism will prohibit waging a war that we have 
good reason to believe is just. The fact that the government has made false-
positive judgments in the past is precisely what undermines having such a 
reason. It is true that the cost of avoiding false positives is inviting false 
negatives – we know that we’ll end up failing to wage some just wars, even if 
we don’t know which ones those are. Ideally we would wage wars only when 
they are just – but this is not an epistemically open option to us. So we are 
left with either waging just and unjust wars, or with waging no wars at all 
(except in extremely rare circumstances). And the epistemic-based contingent 
pacifism will argue that the former option would make things worse overall.  
 
The epistemic contingent pacifist can go further: even if waging no wars at 
all (except in extremely rare circumstances) does not make things go better 
overall, we still ought to be contingent pacifists. The epistemic-based 
contingent pacifist will argue that we ought to abide by the defeasible 
prohibition against waging wars, even if this makes things worse from an 
impartial perspective. This is because, in comparing the consequences of 
adopting the prohibition with those of the status quo, the costs associated 
with allowing evil to occur ought to be given disproportionate weight relative 
to costs associated with actually committing a comparable evil – on the 
grounds that it is better to allow certain harms to occur than it is to commit 
those types of harms. So even if epistemic-based contingent pacifism made 
things impartially worse, we still ought to be contingent pacifists. Of course, 
if this made things much worse from an impartial standpoint, then the moral 
relevance of the doing/allowing distinction will give way under the sheer 
weight of the net harms that could be averted by abandoning the prohibition 
imposed by epistemic-based contingent pacifism. But the point of the 
argument here is not that epistemic-based contingent pacifism is the morally 
correct account of war regardless of its consequences – rather, the point is 
that adopting epistemic-based contingent pacifism need not make things 
impartially better in order for it to be the morally correct account of war.  
Because governments differ in how often they make mistakes or deceive the 
population regarding the justness of wars, epistemic-based contingent 
pacifism yields different answers for different governments regarding the 
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strength of the prohibition against waging wars. Very strong prohibitions will 
apply to some governments, and moderate or mild prohibitions will apply to 
others. So if epistemic-based contingent pacifism is correct, then pacifism in 
war is relative to particular governments, in that it is dependent on the 
reliability of that government’s purported judgments regarding the justness 
of wars. Epistemic-based contingent pacifism is, then, doubly contingent – it 
is contingent in the sense that it admits the possibility of just wars (as all 
forms of contingent pacifism do), and it is contingent in the additional sense 
that the strength of the constraint against waging wars is relative to the 
country in question.  
I believe that a doubly-contingent form of epistemic-based contingent 
pacifism is significantly more plausible than proportionality-based contingent 
pacifism, partly because 1) it is flexible enough to accommodate a permissive 
stance towards war in some contexts and a restrictive stance in others, and 
2) it does not require an implausibly strong agent-centered restriction on 
killing innocents or a revisionist stance on the basis of liability to lethal 
defense. This being said, of the forms of contingent pacifism discussed here, a 
doubly-contingent form of epistemic-based contingent pacifism is the weakest 
form of contingent pacifism, since it allows countries with a history of waging 
only just wars to continue waging wars. One might think, then, that a 
doubly-contingent form of epistemic-based contingent pacifism does not 
count as a version of contingent pacifism at all, on the grounds that it denies 
that a war can be fought only in extremely rare circumstances. But in 
response, a proponent of epistemic-based contingent pacifism might point out 
that the countries with a history of waging only just wars are ones that wage 
wars only in extremely rare circumstances. 
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